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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE ROLE OF DIVIDEND POLICY IN REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
 
BY 
 
NAN LIU 
 
July, 2011 
 
 
Committee Chair: Lawrence Brown 
 
Major Academic Unit: School of Accountancy 
 
Given the importance of historical dividend policy to firms, I investigate whether 
dividend payers manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and 
dividend payout ratios. Using Compustat’s Execucomp database, I find evidence that 
dividend policy impacts both upward and downward real earnings management. I find 
that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of 
pre-managed earnings relative to prior year dividends when pre-managed earnings are 
lower than dividends paid in the prior year, suggesting that dividend levels are an 
important earnings benchmark. I document a stronger relationship between changes in 
pre-managed earnings and real earnings management for payers than for non-payers, 
suggesting that dividend policies impact real earnings management. Consistent with the 
importance of dividend policy in real earnings management, I show that dividend payers 
that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a greater extent than 
dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.  
 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well known that managers try to maintain their firms‟ dividend levels and 
dividend pay-out ratios. Lintner (1956) documents that dividends paid in the current year 
are a function of target pay-out ratios, current earnings, and dividends paid out in the 
prior year. Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) show that dividend-payers try to 
smooth yearly dividend streams and maintain consistency with their past dividend 
policies, e.g., dividend levels and payout ratios.
1
 I examine the role of smoothing 
dividend levels and dividend payout ratios in real earnings management. 
Lintner (1956) argues that dividend policy is the primary decision criterion in 
determining how earnings are distributed between current dividends and retained 
earnings. Dividend policies include setting the existing dividend as the central benchmark, 
targeting a relatively fixed payout ratio, determining whether and how much to change 
dividend payments based on changes in earnings, and making partial adjustment to what 
is suggested by changes in earnings. Lintner (1956, p. 100) finds that managers feel 
pressure to increase dividends when there is a substantial increase in profitability because 
of “their fiduciary responsibilities and standards of fairness”. Twenty-six of the 28 sample 
companies in his study had specific target payout ratios that were invariant over long 
periods of time. More recent survey papers suggest that about half of firms have explicit 
target dividend payout ratios (Baker and Powell, 2000; Baker, Veit and Powell, 2001). 
Consistent with dividends being an important earnings target, Daniel, Denis and Naveen 
                                                        
1
 The dividend payout ratio is the dividend level divided by the earnings level. 
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(2008) find that dividend payers with debt manipulate accruals upward to attain dividend 
targets when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends.  
Dividend levels are a more important target than dividend payout ratios (Baker 
and Powell, 2000; Baker et al., 2001; Brav et al. 2005).  Thus, I argue that the dividend 
level decision is made before the dividend payout ratio decision. When pre-managed 
earnings fall short of expected dividends, maintaining the expected dividend results in a 
payout ratio of over 100 percent, giving rise to the problem of dividend sustainability. 
Manipulating earnings upward through real activities increases firms‟ ability to pay cash 
dividends and makes the payout ratio more sustainable. I expect dividend payers to 
manipulate earnings upward to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to 
expected dividends. On the other hand, when pre-managed earnings exceed expected 
dividends, if dividend levels are not fully adjusted based on changes in pre-managed 
financial performance (Lintner 1956), manipulating earnings downward (upward) helps 
dividend payers to smooth payout ratios in years of earnings increases (decreases). I 
expect dividend payers to manipulate earnings through real activities to a greater extent 
than non-payers. To shed light on the effect of dividend policy on real earnings 
management, I investigate real earnings management behavior within dividend payers. I 
define dividend conservatism as the partial adjustment to dividends, and operationalize it 
as decreases (increases) in pre-managed payout ratios in years of earnings increases 
(decreases).
2
 Managing earnings downward (upward) helps payers that follow 
conservative dividend policies to boost (smooth) pre-managed payout ratios. I expect 
                                                        
2
 The pre-managed payout ratio is defined as dividends paid in year t divided by year t pre-managed 
earnings. 
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dividend payers that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a 
greater extent than dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.  
I define real earnings management as “actions managers take that deviate from 
normal business practices (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, p. 2)”, and proxy real earnings 
management as abnormal cash flows from operations (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; 
Roychowdhury, 2006), abnormal selling, general and administrative expense (Gunny, 
2009), abnormal research and development expense (Gunny, 2009), and abnormal gain or 
loss from sale of assets (Gunny, 2009). Consistent with Daniel et al. (2008), I define 
expected dividends as dividends paid in the prior year. I find that dividend payers 
manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of pre-
managed earnings relative to last year‟s dividends when pre-managed earnings are below 
last year‟s dividends. More importantly, I find that when pre-managed earnings exceed 
last year‟s dividends, the negative relationship between real earnings management and 
changes in pre-managed earnings is stronger for dividend payers than for non-payers. 
Within dividend payers, I document that when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s 
dividends, firms which are more likely to follow a conservative dividend policy 
manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent than firms which are less 
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy when pre-managed earnings exceed (fall 
short of) last year‟s earnings. Furthermore, I document both upward and downward 
earnings manipulation for payers with and without debt. 
My analysis suggests that dividend policies have an incremental effect on both 
upward and downward real earnings management. My study contributes to the earnings 
management and dividend payout policy literatures in several ways. First, I provide a 
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more complete analysis of the dividend policy driving earnings management. Daniel et al. 
(2008) find that firms manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when pre-
managed earnings are below last year‟s dividends, which help firms avoid negative stock 
market reactions if they miss their targets. I extend Daniel et al. (2008) by identifying 
situations where managers have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings both 
downward and upward through real activities when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged 
dividends. Second, unlike Daniel et al. (2008) which argue that dividend restrictions in 
debt contracts drive upward earnings management by dividend payers, my argument is 
based on the priority and interaction of dividend level and dividend payout ratio 
smoothing. Daniel et al. (2008) show that dividend threshold driven accruals 
management is evident only in dividend payers with positive debt, supporting their debt 
covenants argument. I find both upward and downward real earnings manipulation for 
dividend payers with and without debt, supporting my dividend policy argument. Third, I 
provide more direct evidence about the role of dividend policy in real earnings 
management by comparing payers that are more likely to follow conservatism dividend 
policies with payers that are less likely to follow conservatism dividend policies. 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the earnings management and dividend 
policy literatures. Section 3 derives hypotheses. Section 4 describes my data and 
methodology. Section 5 analyzes the association between real earnings management and 
dividend policy. Section 6 examines firms with and without debt separately. Section 7 
provides supplemental test. Section 8 concludes.  
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CHAPTER2 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Earnings management literature 
Earnings equal cash flows plus accruals so they can be manipulated either via 
cash flows or accruals (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 
1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). In a survey of over 400 financial executives, 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find that most earnings management is achieved 
via real actions, such as delaying discretionary expenditures rather than via accrual 
manipulations, such as altering accounting assumptions. Because firms are more likely to 
conduct real activities manipulations than accruals manipulations, I focus on real earnings 
management in my paper. I adopt Cohen and Zarowin‟s (2010, p. 2) definition of real 
earnings management: “actions managers take that deviate from normal business 
practices.” Specifically, I examine manipulation of cash flow from operations (including 
selling, general and administrative expense, and research and development expense) and 
gain on sale of long-term assets.  
Since earnings are one of many signals used to make certain decisions (Schipper, 
1989), managers have incentives to manipulate them to meet earnings related thresholds. 
Prior literature has documented adverse valuation consequence of missing earnings levels, 
earnings changes and analysts‟ forecasts benchmarks (Brown and Caylor 2005), and 
evidence of upward earnings management to meet or just beat important earnings 
benchmarks. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document an upward shift in the distribution 
of cash flows from operations for slightly positive earnings relative to firms with slightly 
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negative earnings.
3
 Burgstahler and Eames (2006) proxy for business management by 
using scaled annual change in cash flows from operations and for reporting management 
by using discretionary accruals based on the Jones model. They conclude that business 
management plays a more important role than discretionary accruals management to 
avoid annual negative earnings surprises.
4
 Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms conduct 
real earnings management to meet or just beat the zero earnings and analyst forecast 
benchmarks.  
Consistent with the importance of meeting earnings benchmarks, manipulating 
earnings downward in one period helps firms to meet future benchmarks by manipulating 
earnings upward in the future. Discretionary expenditures, such as R&D, repairs and 
maintenance, advertisement and employee training programs, and sale of long-term assets 
can be adjusted both upward and downward, enabling firms to make earnings closer to 
some targets through both upward and downward manipulation (Bartov, 1993). Perry and 
Grinaker (1994) find that unexpected R&D is positively related to pre-managed 
unexpected earnings, i.e., when pre-managed unexpected earnings are below zero, firms 
report negative unexpected R&D, and when they are above zero, firms report positive 
unexpected R&D. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms defer R&D to 
boost current reported earnings when pre-managed earnings are below expected earnings, 
and accelerate R&D to decrease current reported earnings when pre-managed earnings 
exceed expected earnings.  
Cohen, Mashruwala and Zach (2009) argue that adjusting advertising is more 
                                                        
3
 While Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document an upward shift in the distribution of cash flows from 
operations for the three quartiles (the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles), they find that the upward shift of the 
conditional distribution of changes in working capital only exists for the upper quartiles (the 75
th
 
percentiles) of the distribution. 
4
 In their footnotes 9 and 10, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) recognize that their evidence is also consistent 
with downward business management and reporting management. 
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feasible than changing R&D because advertising activities require shorter amounts of 
time between the decision and execution times, and most advertising activities are not 
contract-based.
 5
 They document that firms reporting small positive earnings levels or 
earnings changes exhibit lower advertising expenditures than other firms.
6
 According to 
Statement of Position 93-7, paragraph 42 and 43, costs of producing advertising, which 
are not examined by Cohen et al. (2009), “are incurred during production rather than 
when the advertising takes place.” So firms can boost producing advertising to decrease 
current earnings without influencing current sales.   
Similarly, managers have discretion regarding the timing of disposal of property, 
plant and equipment (PPE) and investment. Bartov (1993) documents a negative relation 
between income recognized from disposal of long-term assets and changes in pre-
managed earnings per share (exclusive of income from asset sales) for the three-year 
period 1987-1989, suggesting that firms accelerate income recognition of their asset sales 
when pre-managed earnings fall below lagged earnings, and defer it when pre-managed 
earnings exceed lagged earnings. Since the cost principle creates the upper limit for the 
valuation of PPE and unrealized holding gains are not recorded until the sale of assets, 
the timing of PPE sales is an efficient instrument for manipulating earnings upward. 
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 121 and No. 144 require firms 
to recognize an impairment loss only if the carrying value of a long-term asset exceeds its 
expected undiscounted future cash flows. So the timing of PPE sales can be used to 
manipulating earnings downward. The accounting for available for sale securities 
                                                        
5
 Adjustment of R&D involves disposing of assets, laying workers off, or both (Cohen et al., 2009). The 
media-related outlays they examined are about 45% of expenses reported in Compustat. Their monthly 
advertising information is from a proprietary database constructed by a media-tracking company. 
6
 They find no evidence that firms manipulate advertising to meet or just beat analysts‟ forecasts. Cohen et 
al. (2009) explain the results as being consistent with the notion that manipulating real activities to meet a 
moving benchmark is more difficult than to meet a non-moving benchmark, such as positive earnings.  
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suggests that unrealized holding gains or losses are recognized in net income only when 
these securities are sold (SFAS No. 115). Taken together, firms can accelerate gains or 
defer losses from sale of PPE or available for sale securities to boost earnings, and they 
can defer gains or accelerate losses to manipulate earnings downward. 
More recently, Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) investigate whether firms 
use accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations to manipulate 
earnings. They document a negative relationship between pre-managed earnings (changes 
in pre-managed earnings) and securitization gains, where pre-managed earnings are 
measured as earnings before securitization gains.   
Degeorge et al. (1999, p. 5) state that accruals and real earnings management, 
“whether pushing earnings forward or back, are costly activities.” They find that firms 
meeting or just beating the previous annual earnings benchmark (0 to 4-penny) 
underperform firms just missing the benchmark (-5 to -1-penny), and firms beating the 
previous annual earnings benchmark (5 to 9-penny)
7
 underperform firms strongly beating 
the benchmark (10 to 14-penny). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that in the seasoned 
equity offerings context, the negative effects of real earnings management on future 
financial performance, i.e., return on assets, are greater than the effects of accruals 
management. 
The above discussion suggests that, theoretically and empirically, firms 
manipulate discretionary expenditures and gains from sale of assets upward and 
downward to report earnings closer to targets. While discretionary expenditures are 
negatively related to cash flow from operating activities and earnings, income from asset 
                                                        
7
 They recognized that this group may have reined earnings in. The results also suggest that this group 
underperform the group just missing the threshold. 
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sales is positively related to cash flow from investing activities and earnings.  
 
2.2 Dividend policy literature 
2.2.1 Survey evidence on dividend policy 
Lintner (1956) documents that managers are reluctant to cut dividends and target 
long-term pay-out ratios when making dividend decisions. Current earnings influence 
current dividend decisions through the target payout ratio. Lintner (1956)  defines 
“dividend conservatism” as the partial adjustment in dividends given the current financial 
performance, i.e., dividend change in any given year is only part of the amount indicated 
by the target pay-out ratio and current earnings.
 8
 Lintner (1956) argues that this policy 
helps to stabilize dividend distributions and to create a cash flow cushion to mitigate 
effects of future uncertainties.  
Lintner (1956, p. 100 to 101) finds that management “were generally concerned 
with the decline in favorable proxies and in the weakening of their personal positions 
which they believed would follow any failure to reflect a „fair share‟ of such added 
earnings in dividends… Stockholder reactions in such situations have been sufficiently 
vigorous and effective in enough companies that the fear of such a reaction is an effective 
„burr under the saddle‟ to all managements…” Twenty-six out of the 28 sample 
companies had a specific target payout ratio that did not change over long periods of 
time.
9
 
                                                        
8
 The model specified by Lintner (1956) is ∆Dit = αit + c [(ri Pit) – Di (t -1)] + μit, which can be converted into 
Dit = αit + c (ri Pit) + d Di (t -1) + μit, where D is the level of dividends in a given year, r is the target pay-out 
ratio, and P is the current year‟s after-tax earnings. c is less than 1in order to reflect dividend conservatism 
and partial adjustment . 
9
 According to Lintner (1956), managers take into account investment opportunities, working capital needs, 
and growth of the company along with other considerations in determining the target payout ratio, and they 
would seek outside financing if their firms have particularly abundant investment opportunities. 
10 
 
Consistent with Lintner (1956), Baker, Farrelly and Edelman‟s (1985) find that 
the anticipated level of a firm‟s future earnings and the pattern of its past dividends are 
most important in determining its dividend policy. They also find that managers generally 
agree that their firms should avoid making dividend changes that might soon be reversed, 
and that their firms should have target payout ratios. The chief financial officers agreed 
fairly strongly that dividend payments affect common stock prices and provide signals 
about the firm‟s future prospects. Baker and Powell (1999) also find that managers 
believe firms should avoid changing their regular dividends, have target dividend payout 
ratios, and periodically adjust payouts toward the target ratio. In addition to the value 
relevance of dividend policy and the signaling aspect of dividends, Baker and Powell‟s 
(1999) survey provides some support for the agency explanation for paying dividends.
10
 
Specifically, more than 90 percent of the surveyed financial officers agree that dividend 
payments force firms to seek more external financing, which subjects them to capital 
market scrutiny.  
Baker and Powell (2000) and Baker et al. (2001) conclude there is little change in 
managers‟ views of dividend determinants over time, namely the level of current and 
expected future earnings, and the pattern of past dividends. Baker and Powell (2000) and 
Baker et al. (2001) also find that the desire to maintain a given dividend payout ratio is a 
moderately important factor in determining dividend policy, and about half of the 
responding firms have explicit target payout ratios. 
Using a survey sample of 256 public companies and 128 private firms, Brav et al. 
(2005) investigate payout policies in the 21
st
 century. Their analysis indicates that, 
consistent with dividend conservatism, about 90 percent of dividend-payers have a strong 
                                                        
10
 I discuss the signaling and agency explanation later in this section. 
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desire to avoid dividend reductions and to smooth dividend streams from year to year. 
Eighty-four percent of executives try to maintain consistency with historical dividend 
policies. Brav et al.(2005)‟s analysis shows that maintaining dividend levels is the main 
variable in deciding dividend policies, while pay-out ratios are of secondary 
importance.
11
 Managers believe that dividend decisions convey information to the market 
and that dividend reductions have negative consequences.
 12
    
Overall, survey research reveals that both dividend levels and dividend payout 
ratios are important targets. Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) both find that 
the two variable-Lintner model explains dividend changes for individual firms fairly well. 
The survey results suggest that managers believe that dividend policy is value relevant, 
and that signaling explanations are more important than agency explanations for 
explaining dividend policy.
13
  
2.2.2 Theoretical and empirical evidence of dividend policy 
Mukherjee (2009, p. 157) concludes that “Researchers consistently report that 
abnormal return of a dividend-change announcement is of the same sign as the sign of the 
dividend change. Although researchers have advanced several hypotheses to explain this 
phenomenon, two highly researched and competing hypotheses are the cash flow 
signaling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. According to the cash flow 
signaling hypothesis, the stock price moves in the same direction as the dividend change 
because dividend changes convey information about the firm‟s future growth 
opportunities. The free cash flow hypothesis suggests that price reacts favorably to the 
                                                        
11
 Brav et al. (2005) find that nearly 40% of respondents target dividend per share, 28% target dividend 
payout ratios, 27% target DPS growth, and 13% target dividend yields.  
12
 Managers view their information conveyance as concerning the mean and variance of the distribution of 
future earnings, and they believe that dividends reduce stock risk (Brav et al., 2005). 
13
 In their footnote 14, Brav et al. (2005) recognize that managers might not admit or realize the agency 
conflicts. 
12 
 
announcement of a dividend increase because this increase reduces the agency cost of 
free cash flow. Similarly, the stock price reacts negatively to an announcement of reduced 
dividends because the potential for overinvestment increases.” 
Consistent with managers‟ reluctance to cut dividends, prior literature has 
documented negative stock price reactions surrounding dividend cut announcements. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) find significant negative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of unexpected dividend decreases for the period 1963-1976. They use both 
a naive model and a modified version of the Lintner (1956) model to proxy for expected 
dividends. In the naive model, expected dividends are dividends in the prior quarter. The 
modified Lintner (1956) model expresses the expected change in dividends as a function 
of earnings and lagged dividends, which incorporate the importance of firms‟ targeted 
payout ratios. Healy and Palepu (1988) document significant negative market reactions to 
dividend omission announcements. Ghosh and Woolridge (1989) investigate the effect of 
growth induced dividend cuts on market reaction and document a negative stock market 
response to growth induced dividend cuts, albeit at a smaller magnitude than non-growth 
induced dividend cuts. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) illustrate that for 
dividend changes announced during 1967-1996, firms with dividend reductions 
experience increases in systematic risk and the announcement-day negative market 
reaction is significantly related to the increase in systematic risk.    
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that a dividend payout change will elicit a 
market price change if investors interpret it as signaling changes in the firm‟s future 
performance. Consistent with the signaling argument, Healy and Palepu (1988) document 
earnings increases after dividend initiations. Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998) 
13 
 
find that dividend increases signal permanent future cash flow increases. Brook et al. 
(1998, p. 49) maintain that although permanent-increase firms appear to using dividends 
to signal cash flow increases in year 0, “their subsequent dividend changes in years 1 
through 3 are also consistent with dividend smoothing and the desire to maintain a target 
dividend payout ratio.”  
Agency cost and free cash flow theory posit that the agency problem stems from 
separation of ownership and management, and dividend payments may serve as a means 
of monitoring or bonding managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Self-interested 
managers have incentives to expand the firm beyond its optimal size to increase their 
power and compensation (Jensen, 1986). Paying dividends reduces the internal cash flow 
available to managers and forces firms to seek more external financing, subjecting 
managers to the scrutiny of the suppliers of capital. Capital market scrutiny mitigates 
both monitoring costs and overinvestment problems. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find 
evidence suggesting that managers use dividend payments to help control for agency 
costs. The agency cost and free cash flow theories imply that earnings response 
coefficients are positively related to payout ratios. Kallapur (1994) documents a positive 
association between earnings response coefficients and payout ratios, supporting the free 
cash flow theory.        
  In summary, empirical evidence suggests the following. First, capital markets 
react negatively to unexpected dividend decreases, using both a naive model and a 
modified version of the Lintner (1956) model to proxy for expected dividends. Second, 
firms are likely to smooth dividend levels and dividend payout ratios. Third, earnings 
response coefficients are positively associated with the dividend payout ratio.          
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Motivated by the dividend restrictions in debt contracts, Daniel et al. (2008) 
examine whether managers manipulate accruals upward when earnings before 
discretionary accruals are less than expected dividends. They find that over the period 
1992-2005, dividend-paying firms manipulate earnings upward when they have positive 
debt and their pre-managed earnings are less than total dividends in the prior year. 
Consistent with their contract covenant argument, they find no upward accruals 
management for dividend payers without debt.  
Managers want to maintain a consistent dividend policy, and they would sell 
assets, lay off employees, borrow heavily, or bypass positive net present value projects 
before they would cut dividends (Brav et al., 2005). Given the dominance of the dividend 
level target (Baker and Powell, 2000; Baker et al., 2001; and Brav et al., 2005), I expect 
that managers focus on the expected dividend level before they consider the expected 
dividend payout ratio. When pre-managed earnings fall short of expected dividends, 
maintaining the expected dividends results in a payout ratio of over 100 percent, giving 
rise to the problem of dividend sustainability.
14
 Manipulating earnings upward through 
real activities helps firms smooth the payout ratio while meeting dividend targets, and 
increases firms‟ capacity to pay cash dividends. I expect that dividend payers will 
                                                        
14
 The payout ratio will exceed 100 percent if earnings are smaller than dividend payments. The higher the 
current payout ratio, especially when it exceeds 100 percent, the more difficult it is for managers to achieve 
the current payout ratio in the future. On the other hand, money managers regard a payout ratio below 60% 
as comfortable since it measures dividend sustainability (Hogan, 2010; Laise 2010). 
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manipulate earnings upward to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings when pre-
managed earnings are below expected dividend levels. Consistent with Daniel et al. 
(2008), I define dividend payers as firms that paid dividends in the prior year, and I proxy 
expected dividends as dividends paid in the prior year. For non-payers, I proxy expected 
dividends as zero. My first hypothesis is:  
H1: Dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to meet 
dividend level targets when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends. 
The Daniel et al. (2008) study has two unresolved issues. First, it makes no 
accruals management predictions when pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend 
levels. To address this issue, my second and third hypotheses focus on situations where 
pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend levels.
15
 
Daniel et al. (2008) find that firms manipulate earnings upward to maintain 
dividend levels, and the analysis in section 2.2 suggests that smoothing the dividend level 
and the pay-out ratio is important to managers. The earnings management literature 
suggests that firms have incentives to manipulate earnings downward when pre-managed 
earnings exceed expected earnings and upward when pre-managed earnings fall short of 
expected earnings. I proxy expected earnings as earnings in the prior year. I argue that 
when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends, dividend payers have stronger 
incentives to manipulate earnings downward (upward) than non-payers in years of 
earnings increases (decreases) to smooth payout ratios and dividend levels.  When pre-
managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends and earnings, increases in current 
dividends increase the historical dividend benchmark for future periods. If managers want 
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 For non-payers, the classification of whether or not pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend 
levels is based on whether or not the firm reports profits because expected dividends are zero in this case. 
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to smooth dividend streams and do not fully adjust dividends as suggested by earnings 
increases, the current dividend to earnings ratio falls below the target payout ratio. I 
define this partial adjustment as dividend conservatism. Manipulating earnings downward 
helps dividend payers mitigate the decline in payout ratios while smoothing dividends.
16
 
On the other hand, when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged dividends but fall short of 
lagged earnings, firms have incentives to maintain their dividend levels. If managers do 
not decrease dividends as suggested by earnings declines, the current dividend to 
earnings ratio exceeds the target payout ratio, increasing the payout ratio benchmark for 
future periods. Manipulating earnings upward helps payers to smooth payout ratios while 
maintaining dividend levels. My hypotheses 2a and 2b are: 
H2a: Dividend payers manipulate earnings downward through real activities to a 
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed both last 
year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings. 
H2b: Dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a 
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed last year‟s 
dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings. 
My above discussion about the difference between payers and non-payers is built 
on the argument that payers follow a conservative dividend policy and try to smooth 
payout ratios. To shed light on the effect of dividend policy on earnings management, I 
identify payers that are likely to follow a conservative policy and examine the difference 
in earnings management behavior of payers. I define the pre-managed payout ratio as 
dividends paid in year t divided by year t pre-managed earnings. When pre-managed 
                                                        
16
 Lintner (1956) finds that managers feel pressure to increase dividend distributions when there is a 
substantial increase in profitability. 
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earnings exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings, suspect payers are 
those most likely to follow conservative dividend policies and thus experience decreases 
in pre-managed payout ratios in years of earnings increases. In contrast, non-suspect 
payers are those least likely to follow conservative dividend policies. However, when 
pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings, 
suspect payers are those with increases in pre-managed payout ratios. Manipulating 
earnings downward (upward) helps suspect payers mitigate declines (increases) in payout 
ratios when pre-managed earnings exceed (fall short of) last year‟s earnings. I expect that 
suspect payers manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent to smooth 
dividend levels and payout ratios than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings 
exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings (when pre-managed earnings 
exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings). If dividend policy is 
irrelevant to financial reporting choices, I should not observe any difference in upward or 
downward earnings management between suspect payers and non-suspect payers. My 
third hypothesis examines differences between suspect and non-suspect dividend payers: 
H3a: Suspect dividend payers manipulate earnings downward through real 
activities to a greater extent than non-suspect dividend payers when pre-managed 
earnings equal or exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings.  
H3b: Suspect dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities 
to a greater extent than non-suspect dividend payers when pre-managed earnings equal or 
exceed last year‟s dividends but are below last year‟s earnings. 
The second unresolved question in Daniel et al.‟s (2008) study is whether 
dividend paying firms without debt manipulate earnings via real activities manipulation. I 
18 
 
discuss more about this issue in section 6. Appendix A contains a comprehensive 
description of all the variables I use in my study. Appendix B provides illustrations for 
sample classification. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
I examine the direction and magnitude of manipulation of cash flow from 
operations (CFO), selling, general and administrative expense (SGA), research and 
development expense (RD), and gain from sale of assets (GAIN). My sample consists of 
all firms in Compustat‟s Execucomp database between 1992 and 2009 with sufficient 
annual data to calculate the stated variables shown in Appendix A. Consistent with prior 
literature I omit firms in regulated industries, banks, and financial institutions 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Daniel et al., 2008). To control for outliers, I delete firm-years 
with dividends and payout ratios at the extreme 99
th
 percentile levels and all the other 
variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of their respective distributions (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998; Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003).
17
 
I estimate abnormal cash flows using a modified version of the Roychowdhury 
(2006) CFO model. Specifically, I regresses CFOt/At-1 (CFOt = cash flow from operations; 
At-1 = last year‟s total assets) on an intercept, a scaled intercept 1/At-1, sales (Salest/At-1), 
and change in sales (SCt /At-1). To control for the effects of firm characteristics on firms‟ 
ability to generate cash flows from sales within an industry-year, I also include 
profitability (income before extraordinary items (IBEIt-1/At-1), profit margin (ROSt-1 = 
operating income before depreciationt-1/Sales t-1), firm size (SIZEt-1 = natural log of MVt-1, 
where MVt-1 = lagged market value of common equity), and age (AGEt = years of firm 
                                                        
17
 Specifically, outliers for all the variables are controlled for in the models to estimate abnormal CFO (or 
SGA, RD and GAIN) and in the hypotheses tests. I also control for outliers in earnings available to 
common shareholders (E) since I use it to calculate my main independent variables, namely, shortfall of 
pre-managed earnings (DEFICIT) and pre-managed earnings changes (PMEC). The abnormal CFO (or 
SGA, RD and GAIN) models are estimated after controlling for outliers for all the variables.  
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age, which is the difference between the current year and the first year the firm appears in 
Compustat).
 18
  I estimate abnormal SGA, abnormal RD, and abnormal GAIN using the 
models adopted by Gunny (2009). RCFOt (RSGAt, RRDt, RGAINt) is the residual from 
the cash flow model (SGA model, RD model, GAIN model), and ACFOt (ASGAt, ARDt, 
AGAINt) is the dollar value of abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expenses, abnormal 
RD expenses, and abnormal GAIN) obtained by multiplying the residual by A t-1.  
 
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 
+ β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 AGEt + έt 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 
(SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + 
β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
 
Following prior literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2009), I estimate these 
regressions for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. My sample for H1 (H2) 
is all firm-years with PMEt < DIVt-1 (PMEt ≥ DIVt-1). For non-payers, the classification of 
whether or not pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend levels is based on 
whether or not the firm reports profits because DIVt-1 is zero in this case.
19
 I measure 
                                                        
18
 Industries are classified by two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010, p. 6) argue that this approach “partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions 
that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time.” Additional control variables 
are consistent with the prior literature that controls for measurement errors that might be correlated with 
firm characteristics (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) 
19
 Non-payers with negative pre-managed earnings are included in the H1 sample.  
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earnings available to common shareholders (E) as income before extraordinary items 
minus preferred dividends (Daniel et al., 2008). Consistent with prior literature (Bartov, 
1993; Daniel et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010), I estimate pre-managed earnings (PME) 
as Et – ACFOt, or Et + ASGAt, or Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the proxy for 
real earnings management. I use the following regression model to test the first 
hypothesis:  
 
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 NOND * DEFICIT + β3 D * DEFICIT + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + 
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 LAGE + β10 Fixed effects + ε                            (1) 
 
Following Daniel et al. (2008), the dependent variable is the dollar value of real 
earnings management, namely, ACFO, ASGA, ARD and AGAIN. DEFICIT is the 
shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt. For non-
payers (NOND), DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings from zero profit. The 
variable of primary interest is the interaction between the dividend payer dummy (D) and 
DEFICIT, i.e., D * DEFICIT. Positive (negative) coefficients on β3 for abnormal CFO 
and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models) are consistent with payers 
manipulating earnings upward to meet the dividend level target.  
I control for compensation incentives by including bonus (BONUS) and stock 
incentive ratio (STOCK) (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006；Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008). 
Since Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) find that the role of chief financial officer equity 
incentives on accruals management is greater than that of chief executive officer equity 
incentives, I estimate compensation incentives for both chief financial officers and chief 
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executive officers. I expect positive (negative) coefficients on BONUS and STOCK 
variables for abnormal CFO and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models). 
Following Daniel et al. (2008), I control for growth opportunities (BTM = Book valuet-1/ 
MVt-1), leverage (LEV = Total debtt-1/At-1), and retained earnings (RE = Retained 
earningst-1/At-1). I include these control variables to be consistent with Daniel et al. (2008) 
but I have no expectation regarding their signs because Daniel et al. (2008) did not obtain 
consistent effects of these variables. I include prior year earnings level (LAGE) to control 
for earnings management to meet the lagged earnings benchmark. Positive (Negative) 
coefficients on β9 for abnormal CFO and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models) 
suggest that lagged earnings are an important earnings benchmark. 
The samples for H2a, and H2b are firms with PMEt ≥DIVt-1 and PMEt ≥ Et-1, and 
firms with PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1, respectively. I use model (2) to test H2.  
 
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 PMEC + β3 D * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 
LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                                                                    (2) 
 
To examine the impact of REM‟s effect on earnings changes (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Dechow et al., 2010), I use an asset scaled earnings management measure, namely, 
RCFO, RSGA, RRD and RGAIN. Accordingly, I measure changes in pre-managed 
earnings (PMEC) as (PMEt – E t-1) /At-1.  Negative (positive) coefficients on β3 for 
abnormal CFO and GAIN models (SGA and RD models) are consistent with the notion 
that payers manipulate earnings to a greater extent than non-payers.
20
  
                                                        
20
 I have different estimates on the signs of β3 depending on the circumstances because DEFICIT in model 
1 is DIVt-1 – PMEt, while PMEC in model 2 and 3 equals (PMEt – Et-1)/At-1. The variables are defined to be 
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The sample for H3 includes dividend payers where PME exceeds prior year 
dividends and payout ratios can be reasonably calculated. Following Grullon et al. (2002), 
I calculate the current payout ratio (DIVt /Et) and pre-managed payout ratio (DIVt /PME t) 
for firms with positive E and PME. I also require that firms have at least three years of 
payout ratios available in order to measure their long-term target payout ratios. For H3a, 
the sample includes dividend payers with sufficient pre-managed earnings to cover prior 
year dividends and earnings (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt ≥ Et-1). For H3b, the sample 
includes dividend payers with sufficient pre-managed earnings to cover prior year 
dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings (D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1). The 
purpose of this restriction is to examine the difference in earnings management behavior 
between payers following a conservative dividend policy and other payers that are in the 
same financial position. I use model (3) and model (4) to test H3a and H3b, respectively.  
 
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD1 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD1 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 
STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                               (3) 
 
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD2 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD2 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 
STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                               (4) 
 
SUSPECTD1 in model (3) is an indicator variable for suspect payers that are 
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy and thus experience decreases in pre-
managed payout ratios (relative to their long-term target payout ratio, AVGRATIO) in 
years of earnings increases (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1 and DIVt /PMEt < 
                                                                                                                                                                     
consistent with prior literature. 
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AVGRATIO), and non-suspect payers are those who are less likely to follow a 
conservative dividend policy. Negative (positive) coefficients on β3 for RCFO and 
RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP models) are consistent with the notion that suspect 
payers manipulate earnings downward to a greater extent as the increases in pre-managed 
earnings get larger. In addition, negative (positive) coefficients β1 for RCFO and RGAIN 
models (RSGA and REXP models) are consistent with the notion that suspect payers 
manipulate earnings downward to a greater extent, controlling for the level of PMEC. 
SUSPECTD2 in model (3) is an indicator variable for suspect payers that are 
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy and thus experience increases in pre-
managed payout ratios (relative to long-term target payout ratio) in years of earnings 
decreases (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1 and DIVt /PMEt > AVGRATIO), and non-
suspect payers are those that are less likely to follow a conservative dividend policy. 
Negative (positive) coefficients β3 for RCFO and RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP 
models) are consistent with the notion that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward to 
a greater extent as the decreases in pre-managed earnings get larger. In addition, positive 
(negative) coefficients β1 for RCFO and RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP models) are 
consistent with the notion that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward to a greater 
extent, controlling for the level of PMEC. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports the regression results for the CFO, SGA, RD, and GAIN models 
across industry-years. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), I find significantly positive 
coefficients on sales (β1 = 0.058) and sales change (β2 = 0.021) for the CFO model.  
Moreover, the coefficients on profitability (β3 = 0.228), profit margin (β4 = 0.465) and 
firm size (β5 = 0.006) are significantly positive, while the coefficient on firm age is 
significantly negative (β6 = -0.000). For the SGA model, consistent with Gunny (2009), I 
find a significantly negative coefficient on firm size (β1 = -0.14), and significantly 
positive coefficients on Tobin‟s Q (β2 = 0.015), internal funds (β3 = 0.058), and sales 
change (β4 = 0.111). I also find a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction 
between the sales decrease dummy and sales change (β5 = -1.152).
21
 Consistent with 
Gunny (2009), for the RD model, I find significantly positive coefficients on firm size (β1 
= 0.001), internal funds (β3 = 0.042), and last year‟s RD (β4 = 0.788).
22
 Also consistent 
with Gunny (2009), for the GAIN model, the coefficients on internal funds (β3 = 0.004) 
and sale of PPE (β4 = 0.439) are significantly positive. Unlike Gunny (2009) who found  
a significantly negative coefficient on Tobin‟s Q and an insignificant coefficient on sale 
of investment, the coefficient on sale of investment is significantly positive (β5 = 0.010) 
and the coefficient on Tobin‟s Q is insignificant. The adjusted R-squares from the CFO, 
SGA, RD, and GAIN models are 0.457, 0.209, 0.858, and 0.131, respectively. 
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 Gunny (2009) does not find a significant coefficient on the interaction term. 
22
 Gunny (2009) finds significant positive coefficient on Tobin‟s Q (0.002), while I find insignificant 
negative coefficient on Tobin‟s Q.  
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[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each model. The main dependent and 
independent variables for H1 are the un-scaled abnormal values and DEFICIT. For payers 
(non-payers), DEFICIT measures the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last 
year‟s dividends (positive earnings). Negative DEFICIT suggests that on average, pre-
managed earnings are non-negative and they exceed last year‟s dividend. For H2 and H3, 
the main dependent and independent variables are scaled abnormal values and PMEC. 
For all the models, the abnormal estimates (RCFO, RSGA, RRD, and RGAIN) have a 
mean of zero, and the estimates for PMEC have a mean of 0.01. The percentage of 
dividend payers ranges from 34% in the GAIN model to 47% in the CFO model. The 
average dividend targets ranges from 65 million in the GAIN model to 120 million in the 
RD model. The mean of AVGRATIO is about 0.33 for all four models, with the smallest 
value in the GAIN model (0.31), and largest value in the CFO model (0.35). 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 reports the univariate results to examine the direction of earnings 
management for the three sub-samples for H1, H2a, and H2b. For each group, the first 
line reports the assets scaled value and the second line reports the dollar value. The 
results suggest that on average, firms manipulate earnings upward through CFO, SGA, 
RD, and GAIN when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends. In addition, 
firms manipulate earnings downward when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed both 
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last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings as suggested by negative RCFO and RGAIN 
as well as positive RSGA and RRD. On the other hand, firms manipulate earnings 
upward when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of 
last year‟s earnings as indicated by positive RCFO as well as negative RSGA and RRD.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
To test my hypotheses, I run a cross-sectional regression with industry and year 
dummies as fixed effects. Table 4 provides the multiple-regression results for H1. 
Consistent with H1, β3 is significantly positive in the ACFO model (β3 = 0.335, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that payers manipulate earnings upward to meet the prior year‟s dividend 
target. Specifically, payers report less SGA expense and R&D expense as the earnings 
shortfall increases, indicated by the negative coefficients on D*DEFICIT for the ASGA 
(β3 = -0.789, p < 0.01) and ARD models (β3 = -0.233, p < 0.01). On the other hand, the 
results from the AGAIN model suggest that payers recognize more gain or less loss from 
sales of assets as the earnings shortfall increases (β3 = 0.023, p = 0.015). In summary, the 
results suggest that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate 
the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to the prior year‟s dividend, consistent with 
the notion that the expected dividend is an important earnings benchmark. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
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Table 5 provides the multiple-regression results for H2. Panel A shows that 
consistent with H2a, β3 is significantly negative in the RCFO model (β3 = -0.231, p < 
0.01), suggesting that payers manipulate earnings downward through real activities to a 
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed both last year‟s 
dividends and earnings. Specifically, payers report more SGA expense and R&D expense 
as earnings increases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients on D*PMEC for 
both the RSGA (β3 = 0.612, p < 0.01) and RRD models (β3 = 0.025, p = 0.075). In 
addition, the results from the RGAIN model suggest that payers recognize fewer gains or 
more losses than non-payers as earnings increases get larger (β3 = -0.024, p <0.01). In 
summary, the results suggest that payers manipulate earnings downward through real 
activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed both last 
year‟s dividends and earnings.  
Panel B shows that consistent with H2b, β3 is significantly negative in the RCFO 
model (β3 = -0.211, p < 0.01), suggesting that payers manipulate earnings upward through 
real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last 
year‟s dividends but fall short of last year earnings. Specifically, payers report less SGA 
and R&D expense as earnings decreases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients 
on D*PMEC for the RSGA model (β3 = 0.183, p < 0.01) and RRD model (β3 = 0.053, p = 
0.087). On the other hand, the results from the RGAIN model suggest that payers do not 
manipulate sales of assets to improve earnings after controlling for compensation 
incentives. In summary, the results suggest that payers manipulate earnings upward 
through real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings 
exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings. 
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[Insert Table 5] 
 
Table 6 examines differences among dividend payers. Panels A and B report 
results for H3a and H3b, respectively. Consistent with H3a (Panel A), β1 and β3 are 
significantly negative in the RCFO model (β1 = -0.013, p < 0.01, and β3 = -0.233, p < 
0.01), suggesting that suspect payers manipulate earnings downward through real 
activities to a greater extent than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed 
both last year‟s dividends and earnings. Specifically, suspect payers report more SGA 
expense as earnings increases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients on 
SUSPECTD1*PMEC for the RSGA model (β3 = 0.204, p = 0.062), and they on average 
recognize more SGA expense (β1 = 0.009, p = 0.018). For the RRD model, while the 
coefficient on SUSPECTD1*PMEC is insignificant, the coefficient on suspect payer 
dummy (SUSPECTD1) is significantly positive (β1 = 0.002, p = 0.034), suggesting that 
suspect payers on average report larger R&D expense, controlling for the level of PMEC. 
On the other hand, the negative coefficient on SUSPECTD1 for the RGAIN model 
suggests that suspect payers on average recognize less gains or more losses than non-
suspect payers to manipulate earnings downward (β1 = -0.002, p < 0.01) , controlling for 
the level of PMEC.  In summary, the results suggest that suspect payers manipulate 
earnings downward through real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-
managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends and earnings.  
Consistent with H3b (Panel B), β1 is significantly positive (β1 = 0.008, p < 0.01) 
and β3 is significantly negative (β3 = -0.189, p < 0.01) in the RCFO model, suggesting 
that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a greater extent 
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than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall 
short of last year‟s earnings. Specifically, payers report less SGA expense as earnings 
decreases get larger, indicated by a positive coefficient on SUSPECTD2*PMEC (β3 = 
0.427, p < 0.01) for the RSGA model, and they on average recognize less SGA expense 
(β1 = -0.013, p <0.01). For the RRD model, while the coefficient on SUSPECTD2*PMEC 
is insignificant, the coefficient on the suspect payer dummy (SUSPECTD2) is 
significantly negative (β1 = -0.002, p = 0.065), suggesting that suspect payers on average 
report lower R&D expense, controlling for the level of PMEC. On the other hand, the 
positive coefficient on SUSPECTD2 for the RGAIN model suggests that suspect payers 
on average recognize more gains or less losses than non-suspect payers to manipulate 
earnings upward (β1 = 0.003, p = 0.012). In summary, the results suggest that suspect 
payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a greater extent than non-
suspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of 
last year‟s earnings. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
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CHAPTER 6 
DIVIDEND PAYING FIRMS WITHOUT DEBT 
 
The second unsolved question in Daniel et al.‟s (2008) study is whether dividend 
paying firms without debt manipulate earnings via real activities. Prior literature shows 
that firms‟ ability to manipulate accruals may be restricted (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; 
Barton and Simko, 2002; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008), and that firms are 
more likely to manage real activities than accruals (Graham et al., 2005; Brav et al., 
2005). Unlike accruals management, real earnings management affects cash flows.
 
Thus, 
unlike accruals management, real earnings management affects firms‟ ability to pay cash 
dividends. As such, I expect that real earnings manipulation is a more powerful test of 
dividend policy driving earnings management than accruals management. 
 My prediction for H1 is consistent with the debt covenant argument of Daniel et al. 
(2008). However, my argument is based on the priority and interaction of dividend level 
and dividend payout ratio smoothing, which predicts similar results for dividend payers 
with debt and those without debt. To provide support for the dividend policy related 
earnings management argument, I investigate two types of dividend payers separately: 
those with positive debt and those with zero debt. 
23
  
Table 7 reports the regression results for firms with and without debt. For brevity, 
I only report coefficients on variables pertinent to my hypothesis tests. Panel A shows 
that payers manipulate CFO upward and/or manipulate SGA downward to mitigate the 
shortfall of PME relative to last period‟s dividends regardless of whether or not they have 
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 Similar to Daniel et al. (2008), I examine both public and private debt. The data are obtained from 
Compustat. No debt means zero “Long-Term Debt” and zero “Debt in Current Liabilities”. 
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debt. Panel B indicates that payers manipulate CFO or GAIN downward, and/or SGA 
upward to a greater extent than non-payers when PME exceeds both last year‟s dividends 
and earnings, in cases of positive or zero debt. Panel C reports that payers manipulate 
CFO upward to a greater extent than non-payers when PME exceeds last year‟s dividends 
but fall short of last year‟s earnings, in cases of positive or zero debt. Under this situation, 
payers with debt are more likely to deduct RD expenses, while payers without debt are 
more likely to reduce SGA expenses. In summary, my results suggest that payers 
manipulate earnings through real activities to maintain consistency with their dividend 
policies regardless of whether or not they have debt. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
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CHAPTER  7 
SUPPLEMENTAL TEST 
 
My main dependent variable is abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expense, 
abnormal RD expense, or abnormal GAIN). My main independent variable is based on 
pre-managed earnings, defined alternately as Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – 
AGAINt. This “backing out” method could lead to a potential spurious relation between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables (Lim and Lustgartern, 2002; Elgers, 
Pfeiffer and Porter, 2003). I conduct additional analyses to ensure that my findings are 
not driven by potential spurious association by randomly assigning the calculated 
abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expense, abnormal RD expense, or abnormal GAIN) 
to the sample firms and re-estimating DEFICIT and PMEC using the new measure 
(Daniel et al. 2008). This process defines earnings management as zero plus randomly 
assigned measurement error. I replicate my tests of model 1 and model 2 using randomly 
assigned measurement error, and repeat the process 1,000 times. The results from the 
1,000 iterations represent the effect of measurement error on my proxy for real earnings 
management (Lim and Lustgartern, 2002; Elgers et al., 2003). I then compare the actual 
coefficients of the regressions using my proxy variable with the mean of the coefficients 
from the 1,000 iterations using the randomly assigned measurement error. I calculate p-
values as the proportion of cases where the coefficients from the randomization have a 
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients. A small p-value suggests that the actual 
coefficients are not likely driven by measurement error. The results, as reported in Table 
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8,
24
 indicate that the H1 and H2 results for the CFO model and SGA model are not likely 
driven by measurement error. More specifically, for the CFO model, the p-values of 
0.000 for H1 and H2a suggest that none of the coefficients from the 1,000 iterations has 
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients, while the p-value of 0.041 for H2b 
suggests that there are 41 cases out of the 1,000 iterations where the coefficients have a 
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients. The H1 and the H2a results for the RD 
model and GAIN model hold after controlling for the possible effect of measurement 
error.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
  
                                                        
24
 For simplicity, I only report the results for the coefficients pertinent to my hypothesis tests. H2b for 
the GAIN model is not supported. So I did not conduct the simulation test. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Survey papers suggest that both prior period‟s dividends and target payout ratios 
are important determinants of current dividends, and payers make partial adjustments in 
dividends given current financial performance. In more recent years, dividend levels have 
become a more important target than dividend payout ratios. Daniel et al. (2008) find that 
payers with debt manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when pre-managed 
earnings are below last year‟s dividends. I investigate whether dividend payers 
manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and dividend 
payout ratios.  
Using Compustat‟s Execucomp database, I document that dividend policy has an 
incremental effect on both upward and downward real earnings management. First, I 
show that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the 
shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last year‟s dividends when the current year‟s 
pre-managed earnings are less than last year‟s dividends, suggesting that last year‟s 
dividend level is an important earnings benchmark. Second, I find that when the current 
year‟s pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividend payments, dividend payers 
manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-
managed earnings exceed (fall short of) prior year earnings. Third, within dividend 
payers, I show that payers that are more likely to follow a conservative dividend policy 
manipulate earnings to a greater extent than payers that are less likely to follow a 
conservative dividend policy, consistent with the importance of dividend policy as a 
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determinant of real earnings management. Fourth, I find evidence of both upward and 
downward earnings manipulations for payers with and without debt. 
My study contributes to the earnings management and dividend payout policy 
literatures in several ways. First, I provide a more complete analysis of the dividend 
policy driving real earnings management. Examining upward and downward real 
earnings management behavior is important since Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that 
real earnings management has more severe effects on future financial performance than 
does accruals management, and both upward and downward manipulation may adversely 
impact future performance (Degeorge et al., 1999). Daniel et al. (2008) find that payers 
manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when pre-managed earnings are 
below last year‟s dividends. They make no prediction about earnings management when 
pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends. I extend Daniel et al. (2008) by 
identifying situations where managers have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings 
downward and upward through real activities when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged 
dividends.  
Second, I provide more direct evidence about the role of dividend policy in real 
earnings management. In addition to comparing payers with non-payers, I compare 
payers that are more likely to follow conservatism dividend policies with payers that are 
less likely to follow conservatism dividend policies when pre-managed earnings exceed 
last year‟s dividends. My results support the view that dividend policies have an 
incremental effect on real earnings management. 
Third, my argument is based on the priority and interaction of dividend level and 
dividend payout ratio smoothing, whereas Daniel et al. (2008)‟s argument is based on 
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debt covenants. Daniel et al. (2008) show that dividend threshold driven upward accruals 
management is evident only in dividend payers with positive debt. I find that both 
dividend payers with and without debt manipulate earnings upward through real activities 
to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last year‟s dividends, 
supporting the dividend policy arguments.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
CFO Cash flow from operations  
A Total assets  
SC Sales changet = Salest - Salest-1  
DIV Total common dividends  
D Dividend payer dummyt, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0 , 0 otherwise 
NOND Non-payer dummy, = 1-D 
IBEI Income before extraordinary items  
ROS Operating income before depreciation / sales  
MV Market value of common equity =common shares outstanding * 
year-end-price  
SIZE Natural log of market value of common equity  
AGE Age of firm at year t, which is the difference between year t and 
the first year in which the firm appears in COMPUSTAT. 
RCFO Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:  
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 
(IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 AGEt + έt 
ACFO Dollar value of abnormal cash flows = RCFOt * At-1 
RD Research and development expense (R&D expense) 
SGA Selling, general and administrative expense, excluding RD 
TQ (MV + Book value of preferred stock + Long-term debt + Short-
term debt) / assets 
FUND Internal funds = Income before extraordinary items + RD + 
Depreciation  expense 
SD Dummy variable for sales decreases, =1 if Salest < Salest-1, 0 
otherwise 
RSGA Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 
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(FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
ASGA Dollar value of abnormal SGA = RSGAt * At-1 
RRD Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-
1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
ARD Dollar value of abnormal RD = RRDt * At-1 
GAIN Gain or loss from sale of property, plant and equipment and 
investment 
PPES Sale of property, plant and equipment 
INVS Sale of investment 
RGAIN Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 
(FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
AGAIN Dollar value of abnormal GAIN = RGAINt * At-1 
E IBEI – preferred dividends 
PME Pre-managed earnings= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or 
Et – AGAINt, depending on the proxy for real earnings 
management. 
DEFICIT Shortfall of PME relative to lagged dividendst = DIVt-1 – PMEt 
PMEC Pre-managed earnings changet = (PMEt – Et-1 ) / At-1 
AVGRATIO The average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years 
of payout ratios available, where payout ratio = DIVt /Et. 
SUSPECTD1 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1, and DIVt / PMEt < 
AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise 
SUSPECTD2 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1, and DIVt / PMEt ≥ 
AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise 
BONUS Executive bonust /total compensationt 
SENSITIVE 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + 
number of options held by CEO and CFO) 
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STOCK Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + 
bonus)t  
BTM  Book value of common equityt-1/ MVt-1 
LEV  Total debt t-1 / At-1 
RE Retained earningst-1 / At-1  
LAGE E t-1  
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APPENDIX B 
CONCEPT TREE FOR SAMPLE CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PMEt  ≥  DIVt-1 
Yes
== 
No 
Deficit in pre-managed earnings; 
H1 
Sufficiency in pre-managed earnings; 
 PMEt  ≥  Et-1  
No Yes
== 
PMEt  ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1, 
H2b 
Dividend payers and non-payers;  
PMEt = Et – ACFOt , Et + ASGAt, Et 
+ ARDt, or Et – AGAINt 
SUSPECTD2=1;  
H3b 
 
Other firms 
D=1, E >0, DIVt/PMEt 
< AVGRATIO,  
 Yes
== 
No 
PMEt  ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt  ≥ Et-1, 
H2a 
 
SUSPECTD1=1;  
H3a 
 
Other firms 
D=1, E>0, DIVt/PMEt 
≥ AVGRATIO,  
 
Yes
== 
No 
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATION OF THE NORMAL LEVEL OF CASH FLOW FROM 
OPERATIONS, SGA EXPENSES, R&D EXPENSES, AND GAIN ON SALE OF 
ASSETS 
 
CFO model SGA model RD model GAIN model 
Intercept -0.077*** Intercept 0.282*** Intercept -0.006*** Intercept -0.001 
1/At-1 1.052 1/At-1 8.495*** 1/At-1 0.527*** 1/At-1 -0.038 
Salest/At-1 0.058*** SIZEt-1 -0.14*** SIZEt-1 0.001** SIZEt-1 0.000 
SCt /At-1 0.021*** TQt 0.015** TQt -0.000 TQt -0.000 
IBEIt-1/At-1 0.228*** FUNDt/At-1 0.287*** FUNDt/At-1 0.042*** FUNDt/At-1 0.004* 
ROSt-1 0.465*** SCt/At-1 0.111*** RDt-1/At-1 0.788*** PPESt/At-1 0.439*** 
SIZEt-1 0.006*** 
SDt * 
SCt/At-1 
-1.152*   INVSt/At-1 0.010** 
AGEt -0.000**       
# Ind.-Yr 324  191  204  117 
Adj. R
2
 0.457  0.209  0.858  0.131 
*/**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  
 
 
CFO is cash flow from operationst. 
At-1 is total assetst-1. 
SCt is sales changet = Salest - Salest-1. 
IBEIt-1 is income before extraordinary itemst-1. 
ROSt-1 is operating income before depreciationt-1/salest-1. 
SIZEr-1 is natural log of market value of common equityt-1, where market value equals common shares 
outstanding * year-end-price 
AGEt is the age of the firm at year t, which is the difference between year t and the first year in which the 
firm appears in COMPUSTAT. 
RD is research and development expense (R&D expense)t. 
SGA is selling, general and administrative expenset, excluding RDt. 
TQt equals (MV + Book value of preferred stock + Long-term debt + Short-term debt)t / assetst. 
FUNDr equals Internal fundsr = (Income before extraordinary items + RD + Depreciation expense)t. 
SD is a dummy variable for sales decreasest, =1 if Salest < Salest-1, 0 otherwise. 
GAIN is gain or loss from sale of property, plant and equipment and investmentt. 
PPESt is sale of property, plant and equipmentt. 
INVSt is sale of investmentt. 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for the CFO model 
Variable Firm-Yr Mean Median Std Dev 10
th
 Pctl 90
th
 Pctl 
RCFO 13618 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.07 
ACFO 13618 -20.65 -0.10 249.00 -121.90 87.72 
DEFICIT 13618 -135.73 -32.47 461.05 -384.51 45.70 
PMEC 13618 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.08 0.10 
BONUS 13618 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.34 
STOCK 13618 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.54 
BTM  13618 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.15 0.86 
LEV 13618 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.41 
RE 13618 0.20 0.26 0.51 -0.12 0.60 
D 13618 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
DIV t-1 6410 93.88 22.53 201.95 2.78 251.98 
AVGRATIO 4879 0.35 0.30 0.19 0.12 0.60 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for the SGA model 
Variable Firm-Yr Mean Median Std Dev 10
th
 Pctl 90
th
 Pctl 
RSGA 8492 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.13 
ASGA 8492 -27.86 -4.31 471.50 -206.70 156.99 
DEFICIT 8492 -98.58 -22.75 627.04 -387.79 139.23 
PMEC 8492 0.01 0.00 0.16 -0.15 0.17 
BONUS 8492 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.33 
STOCK 8492 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.55 
BTM  8492 0.44 0.37 0.33 0.15 0.81 
LEV 8492 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.38 
RE 8492 0.17 0.26 0.62 -0.19 0.60 
D 8492 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
DIV t-1 3562 118.62 25.11 277.03 2.65 292.00 
AVGRATIO 2337 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.12 0.57 
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics for the RD model 
Variable Firm-Yr Mean Median Std Dev 10
th
 Pctl 90
th
 Pctl 
RRD 9170 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 
ARD 9170 -4.39 -0.02 114.76 -26.07 17.25 
DEFICIT 9170 -122.09 -33.05 425.09 -337.84 36.81 
PMEC 9170 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.09 
BONUS 9170 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.32 
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STOCK 9170 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.55 
BTM  9170 0.44 0.37 0.33 0.15 0.81 
LEV 9170 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.39 
RE 9170 0.15 0.25 0.67 -0.23 0.59 
D 9170 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
DIV t-1 3792 119.92 26.02 274.02 2.65 294.00 
AVGRATIO 2996 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.11 0.59 
 
Panel D Descriptive statistics for the GAIN model 
Variable Firm-Yr Mean Median Std Dev 10
th
 Pctl 90
th
 Pctl 
RGAIN 5204 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
AGAIN 5204 -0.14 -0.13 30.37 -5.28 2.81 
DEFICIT 5204 -83.72 -28.57 297.14 -238.95 40.54 
PMEC 5204 0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.09 0.10 
BONUS 5204 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.33 
STOCK 5204 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.57 
BTM  5204 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.14 0.75 
LEV 5204 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.36 
RE 5204 0.11 0.24 0.75 -0.35 0.61 
D 5204 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
DIV t-1 1777 65.06 17.00 146.90 2.05 160.42 
AVGRATIO 1395 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.10 0.54 
 
 
RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. 
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ARD equals RRDt* At-1. 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends). 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
DEFICIT is the shortfall of PME relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt  
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1. 
BONUS equals Executive bonust /total compensationt. 
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held 
by CEO and CFO). 
STOCK is Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t  
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BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1. 
LEV is total debtt-1/ At-1. 
RE is retained earningst-1/ At-1. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
AVGRATIO is the average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years of payout ratios available, 
where payout ratio = DIVt/Et. 
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TABLE 3 
TEST FOR THE DIRECTION OF REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Group CFO model SGA model RD model GAIN model 
 
#Firm-
Yrs 
 Mean 
#Firm-
Yrs 
 
Mean 
#Firm-
Yrs 
Mean 
#Firm-
Yrs 
Mean 
 
PMEt  < DIVt-1 3207 0.029* 3034 -0.073* 1947 0.000 1188 0.002* 
  
49.73* 
 
-213.9* 
 
-8.59*  2.61* 
       
  
PMEt  ≥ DIVt-1, 
and PMEt  ≥ Et-1 6908 -0.026* 3884 0.072* 4940 0.001* 2913 -0.001* 
 
 
-82.67* 
 
138.85* 
 
0.73  -1.61* 
 
      
  
PMEt  ≥ DIVt-1 
and PMEt < Et-1 3503 0.024* 1574 -0.037* 2283 -0.002* 1103 0.000 
 
 
37.21* 
 
-80.61* 
 
-11.88*  0.78 
       
  
* Significant at the 5 % level two-tailed. 
For each group, the first line is the assets scaled value and the second line is the dollar value. 
 
 
RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. 
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ARD equals RRDt* At-1. 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends). 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
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TABLE 4 
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H1 
 
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are 
not reported in the tables. 
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 NOND * DEFICIT + β3 D * DEFICIT + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM 
+ β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 LAGE + β10 Fixed effects + ε                            (1) 
DV ACFO ASGA ARD AGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Intercept 0.093 0.990 42.795 0.003 6.286 0.488 -3.926 0.132 
D -13.478 0.033 8.213 0.474 11.456 0.174 -2.669 0.336 
NOND*DEFICIT 0.002 0.900 -0.554 <.001 0.009 0.604 0.012 0.033 
D*DEFICIT 0.335 <.001 -0.789 <.001 -0.233 <.001 0.023 0.015 
BONUS 188.961 <.001 -308.424 <.001 -107.703 0.001 54.728 <.001 
STOCK 67.779 <.001 -109.940 <.001 -43.816 0.026 5.298 0.328 
BTM -7.088 0.220 4.666 0.712 10.660 0.154 1.435 0.565 
LEV 23.061 0.139 -132.455 <.001 -0.033 0.999 3.984 0.489 
RE 2.489 0.540 10.176 0.112 -3.081 0.358 0.861 0.330 
LAGE 0.157 <.001 -0.449 <.001 0.071 <.001 -0.002 0.601 
 
  
ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:  
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends). 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
NOND is non-payer dummy, = 1-D. 
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt  
BONUS equals Executive bonust /total compensationt. 
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held 
by CEO and CFO) 
STOCK is Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t  
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BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1. 
LEV is total debt t-1 / At-1. 
RE is retained earningst-1 / At-1. 
LAGE is last year‟s E. 
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TABLE 5 
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H2 
 
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are 
not reported in the tables. 
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 PMEC + β3 D * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 
RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                                                                    (2) 
Panel A. H2a, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt  ≥ Et-1 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Intercept -0.016 <.001 0.048 <.001 0.004 <.001 0.000 0.565 
D 0.008 <.001 -0.040 <.001 -0.003 <.001 0.001 0.191 
PMEC -0.197 <.001 0.306 <.001 -0.008 0.098 -0.003 0.223 
D*PMEC -0.231 <.001 0.612 <.001 0.025 0.075 -0.024 0.002 
BONUS 0.038 <.001 -0.055 <.001 -0.006 0.015 -0.002 0.229 
STOCK 0.018 <.001 -0.034 <.001 0.001 0.491 0.001 0.228 
BTM -0.007 <.001 -0.008 0.051 -0.001 0.531 0.000 0.791 
LEV -0.013 <.001 -0.021 0.007 -0.005 0.028 -0.001 0.331 
RE -0.009 <.001 0.016 <.001 -0.001 0.233 -0.001 0.123 
 
Panel B. H2b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Intercept 0.013 <.001 -0.013 0.003 -0.001 0.674 -0.002 0.078 
D -0.010 <.001 0.019 <.001 -0.003 0.030 0.000 0.760 
PMEC -0.263 <.001 0.345 <.001 -0.049 0.000 0.007 0.412 
D*PMEC -0.211 <.001 0.183 0.010 0.053 0.087 -0.014 0.484 
BONUS 0.089 <.001 -0.092 <.001 -0.010 0.010 0.007 0.003 
STOCK 0.024 <.001 -0.039 <.001 -0.001 0.651 0.005 <.001 
BTM -0.033 <.001 0.025 <.001 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.459 
LEV -0.021 <.001 0.009 0.309 0.000 0.917 0.002 0.419 
RE 0.008 <.001 -0.006 0.039 -0.004 0.005 0.000 0.647 
 
 
RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.   
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
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RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.   
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends). 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings changet = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1. 
BONUS equals Executive bonust  /total compensationt. 
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held 
by CEO and CFO) 
STOCK is Stock incentive ratio t = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t  
BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1. 
LEV is total debtt-1 / At-1. 
RE is retained earningst-1 / At-1. 
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TABLE 6 
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H3
25
 
 
Panel A. H3a, when, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt  ≥ Et-1 
 
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are 
not reported in the tables. 
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD1 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD1 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + 
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                               (3) 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Intercept 0.013 <.001 -0.034 <.001 -0.004 0.010 0.003 0.002 
SUSPECTD1 -0.013 <.001 0.009 0.018 0.002 0.034 -0.002 0.009 
PMEC -0.393 <.001 0.769 <.001 0.031 0.410 -0.063 0.004 
SUSPECTD1*
PMEC -0.233 0.001 0.204 0.062 0.036 0.369 0.022 0.337 
BONUS 0.028 <.001 -0.047 <.001 -0.006 0.004 0.001 0.502 
STOCK 0.011 <.001 -0.008 0.092 -0.003 0.045 0.002 0.029 
BTM -0.014 <.001 0.019 <.001 0.003 0.019 <.001 0.886 
LEV -0.010 0.020 0.037 <.001 0.006 0.011 -0.006 <.001 
RE -0.001 0.572 0.022 <.001 -0.002 0.106 -0.003 0.002 
 
Panel B. H3b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1 
 
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are 
not reported in the tables. 
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD2 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD2 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + 
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε                               (4) 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Intercept 0.016 <.001 -0.008 0.210 -0.004 0.045 -0.001 0.579 
SUSPECTD2 0.008 <.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.002 0.065 0.003 0.012 
PMEC -0.323 <.001 0.099 0.326 0.029 0.348 -0.031 0.296 
SUSPECTD2*
PMEC -0.189 0.004 0.427 <.001 0.003 0.909 0.047 0.175 
BONUS 0.057 <.001 -0.055 <.001 -0.010 0.001 0.010 <.001 
                                                        
25
 Sample for H3 includes payers where payout ratio and pre-managed ratio can be calculated, and which 
have at least three years of payout ratios. 
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STOCK 0.009 0.016 -0.016 0.033 -0.001 0.511 0.001 0.550 
BTM -0.026 <.001 0.027 <.001 0.009 <.001 0.000 0.839 
LEV -0.036 <.001 0.039 <.001 0.002 0.529 -0.003 0.273 
RE -0.008 0.016 -0.003 0.653 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.456 
 
 
RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.   
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.  
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.   
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends). 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1. 
AVGRATIO is the average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years of payout ratios available, where 
payout ratio = DIVt / Et. 
SUSPECTD1 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1, and DIV t /PMEt < AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise. 
SUSPECTD2 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1, and DIV t /PMEt ≥ AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise 
BONUS equals Executive bonus t /total compensation t. 
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held 
by CEO and CFO) 
STOCK is Stock incentive ratio t = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t  
BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1. 
LEV is total debtt-1 / A t-1. 
RE is retained earningst-1 / A t-1. 
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TABLE 7 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIVIDEND PAYERS AND NON-PAYERS 
26
 
 
Pane A. H1, when PMEt < DIVt-1 
DV ACFO ASGA ARD AGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Debt:  
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 2,771 
 
2,534 
 
1,595 
 
938  
D*DEFICIT 0.340 <.001 -0.788 <.001 -0.235 <.001 0.027 0.012 
       
  
Zero debt: 
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 436 
 
500 
 
352 
 
250  
D*DEFICIT 0.335 <.001 -0.594 <.001 0.017 0.721 -0.007 0.235 
 
 Panel B. H2a, when PMEt  ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt  ≥ Et-1 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Debt: 
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 6056 
 
3,254 
 
4,111 
 
2,302  
D*PMEC -0.228 <.001 0.633 <.001 0.034 0.018 -0.023 0.017 
       
  
Zero debt: 
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 852 
 
630 
 
829 
 
611  
D*PMEC -0.211 <.001 0.374 <.001 -0.000 0.999 -0.033 0.011 
 
Panel C. H2b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1 
DV RCFO RSGA RRD RGAIN 
 
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value 
Debt: 
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 2,970 
 
1,244 
 
1,914 
 
842  
D*PMEC -0.157 0.002 0.025 0.746 0.060 0.058 -0.000 0.985 
       
  
Zero debt: 
      
  
# Firm-Yrs. 533 
 
330 
 
369 
 
261  
D*PMEC -0.403 0.008 0.620 0.001 -0.012 0.921 -0.049 0.155 
 
 
ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:  
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
                                                        
26
 For simplicity, I only report the results for the coefficients pertinent to my hypothesis tests. 
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ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends. 
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividendst. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt  
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1. 
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TABLE 8 
COMPARISONS OF ACTUAL MAGNITUDES WITH RANDOMIZED 
MAGNITUDES 
 
I compare the actual coefficients pertinent to my hypothesis tests (Actual) with the simulation 
results by randomizing the real earnings management measures when calculating of DEFICIT or 
PMEC (Random). 
 
H1 (D*DEFICIT) H2a (D*PMEC) H2b (D*PMEC) 
 
Actual Random p-value Actual Random p-value Actual Random p-value 
CFO model 0.335 -0.024 0.000 -0.231 -0.028 0.000 -0.211 -0.182 0.041 
          
SGA model -0.789 -0.146 0.000 0.612 0.031 0.000 0.183 0.121 0.007 
          
RD model -0.233 0.184 0.000 0.025 -0.005 0.000 0.053 0.075 0.939 
          
GAIN model 0.023 -0.009 0.024 -0.024 -0.018 0.000 
   
p- values equal the proportion of the 1000 iterations where the indicated statistic was more positive 
(negative) than the corresponding actual coefficients. 
 
 
ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:  
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 
AGEt + έt 
ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt 
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt 
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year: 
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt 
E is income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends. 
PME is pre- managed earningst = Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the 
proxy for real earnings management. 
DIV is total common dividends. 
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise. 
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt  
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1. 
 
